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Notes and Comments
THE RIGHT OF A MARRIED WOMAN TO USE HER
BIRTH-GIVEN SURNAME FOR
VOTER REGISTRATION
Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections'
Almost all women in the United States adopt the surnames of their
husbands when they marry. Although the professional woman who uses
her own - or an assumed - name for the purpose of her career is a
familiar phenomenon, no one is surprised that she is known by the sur-
name of her husband for all other purposes.' Little girls know that they
are supposed to marry and change their names when they grow up, and
they often have very serious conversations together about the import-
ance of choosing a mate with a euphonious last name. Notwithstand-
ing this well established pattern, in Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections the Maryland Court of Appeals found that in the state of
Maryland no legal basis exists for denying a married woman the right
to register to vote using her birth-given surname. In reaching this
decision, the court recognized the right of a woman to have her choice
of a name treated in the same manner as that of a man.
Mary Emily Stuart, a married woman who had registered to
vote using her birth-given surname, petitioned the Circuit Court for
Howard County to reinstate her registration after it was cancelled by
the Election Supervisors. The trial judge concluded that "the use by
the wife of the husband's surname following marriage, while the same
may have been initially based upon custom and usage, is now based on
the common law of England, which law has been duly adopted as the
law of this State."3 The trial court further concluded that the election
laws of Maryland4 require a married woman to use this "legal sur-
1. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
2. See In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), where the court
refused to grant a naturalization petition of a married woman musician in her maiden
name. In a very moralistic opinion the court explained that many professional women
are known by one name in public and by another in private, and failed to find any
detriment to any of them in that common situation.
3. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, Civil No. A-5789 Law (Cir. Ct.
Howard Cty., May 10, 1972).
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-18(a) (3), 3-18(c) (1971), are the statutory
provisions which the court of appeals construed. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-18(a) (3)
(1971) provides:
(a) Reports to be made by certain public agencies. - Reports to the board shall
be made by the several officials in Baltimore City at least once each month, and
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name" for the purpose of voter registration,' and that, although the
common law of Maryland permits any person to change his or her
name through consistent and non-fraudulent use of a desired new name,'
this common law right is superseded in the case of married women
by the provisions of the election laws which regulate voter registration.7
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision. It explicitly rejected each of these legal interpretations,
finding that the Supervisors of Elections were without power to deny to
the appellant the right to register under the name she had consistently
and non-fraudulently used both before and after her marriage. In an-
swering the narrow question concerning voter registration, the Court
of Appeals also determined that the common law of Maryland imposes
no requirement that a married woman use the surname of her husband
as her own surname,8 that the Maryland statutory provisions on voter
registration impose no such requirement, 9 and that the common law right
in the several counties by the last days of January and July in each year, as
follows:
(3) The clerk of the Court of Common Pleas in Baltimore City and the clerk of
the circuit court for each county shall file with said respective boards the former
and present names of all female residents of said city or county, as the case may
be, over the age of eighteen years, whose names have been changed by marriage
since the date of the last such report
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-18(c) (1971) provides in part:
(c) Notification to show cause before cancellation. - Whenever the . . .
change of name by marriage . . . of any registered voter is reported as above
provided, the board shall cause to be mailed to the address of such voter . . . a
notification that such . . . change of name by marriage . . . has been reported
to the board, and shall require the voter to show cause within two weeks after
the mailing of such notification why his registration should not be cancelled. If no
sufficient cause shall be shown, the registration of such voter shall be cancelled....
5. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, Civil No. A-5789 Law (Cir.
Ct. Howard Cty., May 10, 1972).
6. See Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940).
7. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, Civil No. A-5789 Law (Cir.
Ct. Howard Cty., May 10, 1972).
8. 266 Md. at 448, 295 A.2d at 227.
9. The Board of Supervisors of Elections contended on appeal that the regis-
tration provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-18(a)(3), 3-18(c) (1971) [see
note 4 supra], imposed a legal requirement upon married women to use the surnames
of their husbands when registering to vote, or in the alternative, that the long-
standing interpretation of the statute as one imposing such a requirement had in
itself worked a change in the common law which made registration by married women
in their husbands' surnames mandatory. The Maryland Court of Appeals disposed of
these contentions in summary fashion. It found that the statute was neutral on its
face, requiring only married women who had in fact changed their surnames to use
these surnames for purposes of voter registration, and found itself ". . . unable to
attribute to that Section, even with the aid of a long-standing and uniform adminis-
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of the individual to change his or her name by consistent and non-
fraudulent use of a new name still exists in Maryland and extends to
married women.1" The decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Stuart is a careful and accurate interpretation of the common law of
personal names, but it has a more significant aspect as well. It is an
indication that courts may be beginning to treat questions involving
the legal status of women with the seriousness which these questions
deserve.
The majority in Stuart pointed out that "what constitutes the
correct legal name of a married woman under common law principles
is a question which has occasioned a sharp split of authorities . . .""
in American courts. By resolving the question of married women's
surnames in favor of the position urged by the appellant, the court
aligned itself with the position advocated by "women's liberation"
groups; however, while the decision may certainly be seen as a victory
for those women seeking legal equality with men, it is not an example
of a court yielding its legal judgment to a highly vocal minority. An
analysis of the development of surnames and of the gradual erosion
of the legal position of women epitomized in the doctrine of coverture
demonstrates the legal validity of the Stuart decision. This note will
focus upon the development of the law of personal names, particularly
as it has affected the surnames of married women. In addition, while
neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed the constitu-
trative practice, such an effect in derogation of the common law." 266 Md. at 449,
295 A.2d at 228. Ample authority for this determination was found in Maryland
decisions holding that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed. See, e.g., MacBride v. Gulbro, 247 Md. 727, 234 A.2d 586 (1967);
Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 201 A.2d 353 (1964); Mayor & City Council v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 232 Md. 123, 192 A.2d 87 (1963). This conclusion is also
supported by common sense. The statute in question merely prescribes administrative
duties for state officials. It is difficult to understand how such a statute could impose
affirmative duties upon, or abrogate common law rights of individuals.
10. 266 Md. at 446, 295 A.2d at 226.
11. 266 Md. at 445, 295 A.2d at 225. This split is exemplified by two mid-
western cases, neither of which is distinguishable from Stuart on its facts. Both in-
volved petitions from women, who had become well-known in their professions before
they married, to continue to use their birth-given surnames for purposes of voter
registration. In State ex el. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616
(1961), relied upon by the Stuart majority, an Ohio court found that a married
woman is permitted under the common law to retain her own surname or to adopt
the surname of her husband according to her own choice. An Illinois court deter-
mined that the common law requires a married woman to be known legally by the
surname of her husband in People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d
642 (1945). Judge Smith's dissenting opinion in Stuart cited the Lipsky case as its
leading authority. See 266 Md. at 454, 295 A.2d at 230.
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tional implications presented by the Stuart case, the position urged by
the dissent presents some important questions about the scope of the
protection offered by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution" which must be answered in any complete discussion of
the surnames of married women.
ENGLISH COMMON LAW ROOTS
Perhaps the best way to determine the validity of the conclusion
that a married woman is permitted under the law to retain her own
surname after her marriage is to turn to the common law and to ex-
amine the history of the development of surnames in England, the
country which has had the greatest influence upon the customs and
laws of the United States. Surnames developed in England at the
close of the middle ages, at a time when the limited number of avail-
able given names'" and the beginning of some geographical and social
mobility made identification of persons by the use of only a given name
a matter of some confusion and difficulty.'
4
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent portion: "No state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
It is a well-recognized principle of constitutional law that a state may classify people
and accord unequal treatment to members of separate classes only so long as there is
a rational basis for distinguishing the state-created classes and only so long as the
distinction has some "substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. . . ." F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Furthermore, some statutory classifica-
tions have been found to be so repugnant to the concept of equality that they have
been designated as "suspect" and certain rights have been considered to be so funda-
mental that the Supreme Court has required any state seeking to uphold the validity
of a statute employing such "suspect" criteria or affecting such "fundamental rights"
to show that the statute is justified by a "compelling governmental interest." See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussion
of the development of "suspect" classifications).
The view of the law urged by Judge Smith in Stuart creates a two-fold
classification by sex. It abridges the common law right of the individual to adopt a
new name without resort to legal procedures with respect to married women, and it
approves differential treatment for married women in respect to voter registration.
Despite wide recognition of the legal premise that state laws differentiating between
men and women raise significant equal protection questions [Cf. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971)], Judge Smith saw no constitutional question in the Stuart case
other than "that of judicial legislation." 266 Md. at 451, 295 A.2d at 228.
13. P. REANY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH SURNAMES 83 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as REANY]; Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227 (1905) [hereinafter
cited as Arnold], estimates that there are no more than two hundred given names in
common usage.
14. REANY 83.
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Surnames were adopted and discarded at will when their use first
became common, and it was not unusual for one person to have sev-
eral different surnames in the course of a lifetime.'" They were derived
from personal physical and mental characteristics, occupations or places
of residence, and were generally not transmissible from parents to chil-
dren. 6 It is interesting to note that at the end of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, when the adoption of a surname was just taking
on the characteristic of a universal custom, "[a] 11 the types found
for names of men occur also for those of women."' 7 No requirement
or custom demanded that a woman adopt the surname of her father,
or, when she married, of her husband, and records of the times show
that husband and wife often were known by different surnames.' s
Where the whole family did use the same surname, women sometimes
adopted the surnames of their husbands, and men sometimes adopted
the surnames of their wives."x The primary factor involved in de-
termining the family surname seems to have been ownership of prop-
erty, and it was not uncommon for children, male and female, to adopt
the surname of their mother where she was an heiress, or for other
reasons the largest property owner in the family.2"
As the complexity of society increased and surnames became a
necessary feature in the identification of individuals, the original fluid-
ity associated with their adoption and abandonment decreased, but did
not altogether disappear.21  With the trend toward identifying all
members of a nuclear family group by the same surname evolved a
15. Arnold 227-28.
16. Id. Many modern surnames, such as Smith, Strong, Goodman, Baker, Brooks,
are clearly derived from the habit of calling people by easily identifiable personal
characteristics or occupations.
17. REANY 83.
18. Id. 84-85.
19. Id. 83-84.
20. Reginald Damemalde (son of Dame Maud) and Adam Damemagot (son of
Dame Margot) probably inherited property from their mothers. Robert Feligsdoghter
must have been the son of a woman whose mother was named Felis or Felicia.
REANY 84-85.
21. Arnold 227-28. In the predominantly Catholic society of medieval and
renaissance England the name given a child at baptism was the only significant name,
since this name symbolized the individual's relationship with God and the Church.
The surname was a secular name, arbitrarily adopted for the purpose of description
and identification of the person thus named, and of little importance to the ecclesiastical
mind. Although the individual was not permitted to alter his or her baptismal name,
no such prohibition existed with respect to surnames. Even after the law had achieved
independence from the Church, few regulations were made with regard to names,
and the individual remained free to change his or her surname at will. Id.
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parallel trend for women to adopt the surnames of their husbands'
families at marriage. With the passage of time this trend became the
almost universal practice of married women.
The traditional association in English society between surnames
and property ownership suggests a plausible hypothesis to account
for the gradual abandonment by women of their own individual sur-
names, a trend which is otherwise almost inexplicable. The doctrine
of coverture is a common law concept which makes the husband the
guardian of the wife, giving him complete power to manage all the
affairs of his wife and depriving the married woman of any right to
manage her legal affairs without the consent and agency of her hus-
band.22 It has been said that under the system of coverture a married
woman was classed with children, lunatics and imbeciles as a person
incapable of handling her own legal affairs, and that upon marriage,
her legal existence was "incorporated and consolidated into that of
[her] husband."23 The famous comment that "a husband and wife
are one, [and] the one is the husband"24 is an apt description of the
status of married women under coverture. Although the origin of
the legal disabilities of married women embodied by coverture is ob-
scure, it seems likely that the development of the doctrine involved a
gradual erosion of the legal rights of married women. 5 Pollack and
Maitland note that the "unity of person" between husband and wife,
which is the essence of coverture, did not exist in the thirteenth cen-
tury.2" Although the term "coverte de barone" appeared in legal writ-
ings about married women shortly after the Norman invasion, when
French became the fashionable tongue of the educated person, the term
seems originally to have referred to the sexual union between hus-
band and wife, and not to the husband's superior social and legal
status.2 It is not likely that men and women were completely equal
before the law in medieval society, but it may be asserted with some
justice that the general progress of the law, at least with respect to
the legal rights of married women was backward, rather than for-
ward:
. . . [W]e [must protest] against the common assumption that
... from the age of savagery until the present age every change
22. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
25. Reany infers from the fact that children took their mothers' names during
the fourteenth century, the additional fact that married women must have been able
to hold land in their own right. REANY 84.
26. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 403 (1895).
27. Id. 404 n.4.
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in the marital law has been favourable to the wife .... We can-
not be certain that for long centuries the presiding tendency was
not one which was separating the wife from her blood kinsmen,
teaching her to "forget her own people and her father's house"
and bringing her and her goods more completely under her hus-
band's dominion. On the extreme verge of our legal history we
seem to see the wife of AEthelbirht's day leaving her husband
of her own free will and carrying off her children and half the
goods .... (T)he law when it changes does not always change
in favour of the wife.2"
Acceptance of the assertions of Pollack and Maitland results in
viewing the "progress" of the English common law with respect to
the rights and status of married women as a gradual but steady
diminution. Seen in this light the abandonment of personal, individ-
ual surnames by married women becomes comprehensible, indeed al-
most inevitable, as a symbol of their identity with their husbands, and
as a symbol of their lack of individual importance in society. It also
becomes logical for all children, male and female, to adopt their father's
name, because the father's importance in the scheme increases as the
importance of the mother decreases. However, although married
women by custom almost always adopt the surnames of their husbands,
the practice was never a legal requirement in England, and it has never
reached the level of a legal requirement there.2 In his summary of the
laws of England, the Earl of Halsbury explained that "[w] hen a woman
on her marriage assumes, as she usually does in England, the surname
of her husband . . ., it may be said that she acquires a new name by
repute. The change of name is in fact, rather than in law, a consequence
of the marriage."30
English case law supports this assertion. In Cowley v. Cowley 1
the House of Lords declared itself powerless to prevent the former wife
of the Earl of Cowley from calling herself Countess Cowley. Despite the
fact that the dissolution of her marriage to the Earl, and her subsequent
28. Id. 400-01.
29. The wife of Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England, refused to
take the surname of her illustrious husband, according to M. TURNER-SAMUELS, THE
LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 345 (1957). A more recent illustration of the freedom of
English women to retain their own surnames is Dr. Edith Summerskill, a well-
known political figure, who is married to a Dr. Samuels, and whose daughter, Dr.
Shirley Summerskill, M.P., is a married woman. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae
at 5 n2, Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
30. 19 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 829 (3d ed. 1957).
31. [1901] A.C. 450.
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remarriage to a commoner, deprived her of the legal right to the title,
the House of Lords refused to enjoin her from using it, and refused
to require her to adopt the surname of her new husband.3 2
No English case has decided the precise question posed in Stuart,
perhaps because English interpretations of the common law of names
made it unnecessary for a woman to ask the courts to permit her to re-
tain her own name after marriage. The longstanding common law right
of the individual to change his or her surname by reputation' has
always applied equally to men and women.34
THE AMERICAN CASES
Although Mary Stuart was the first married woman to ask a
Maryland court to decide the question of her right to retain her birth-
given surname after marriage, the recognition by Maryland case law
of the general common law right of the individual to change his or her
legal surname without resort to legal process made the decision reached
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Stuart inevitable. In Romans v.
State3 5 the court upheld the validity of a criminal prosecution which
the state had brought in an alias commonly used by the defendant,
pointing out that "[i]f there is no statute to the contrary, a person may
adopt any name by which he may become known, and by which he
may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued."3 6
This legal conclusion was affirmed and expanded by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Lane, where the
court approved the view that the existence of a court-sanctioned name
change procedure does not abrogate the individual's common law
right lawfully to change his or her name through habit or usage.
32. Cowley v. Cowley, [1901] A.C. 450, 460. See also DuBoulay v. DuBoulay,
[1869] L.R. 2 P.C. 430, in which the court said that where a woman used and gave
to her illegitimate child the family name of the child's father, the father's family
had no right to prevent the use of the family name by the illegitimate child.
33. E.g., Davies v. Lowndes, 131 Eng. Rep. 1247, 1255 (1835).
34. E.g., Cowley v. Cowley, [1901] A.C. 450, 460; DuBoulay v. DuBoulay,
[1869] L.R. 2 P.C. 430; see note 32 supra and accompanying text. In fact, under
the English view of names the married woman who adopts her husband's surname
is really exercising her common law right to acquire a new surname by reputation.
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
35. 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1945).
36. 178 Md. at 597, 16 A.2d at 646. For the response of the Maryland Court of
Appeals to the contention that MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-18(a) (3), 3-18(c) was
a "statute to the contrary," see note 9 supra.
37. 246 Md. 55, 62-63, 227 A.2d 231, 235-36 (1967).
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State ex rel. Krupa v. Green88 was the primary American au-
thority cited by the Maryland Court of Appeals in support of its de-
cision in Stuart, and properly so, for Green is the only previous Amer-
ican decision to approach the issue of married women's surnames from
the general context of the legal history of surnames and to bring a
searching common law analysis to bear upon the question. This
analysis led the Green court to hold that "[i]t is only by custom, in
English speaking countries, that a woman, upon marriage, adopts the
surname of her husband in place of the surname of her father." 9
Earlier American decisions also accepted the view that the common
law does not require a married woman to change her surname to that
of her husband. In 1889 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the
validity of a mortgage executed by a married woman in her birth-
given surname in Lane v. Duchac.4 ° Noting that it was the consistent
practice of the mortgagee to use her birth name in business transac-
tions, the court held that:
True, since her marriage, .... [the mortgagee] is entitled to
the name of her husband, . . .but we are aware of no law that
will invalidate obligations and conveyances executed by and to
her in her baptismal name, if she chooses to give or take them in that
form.41
A similar opinion was expressed by the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals for the state of Texas in Rice v. State42 where the court over-
turned a rape conviction, holding that the mere fact that the alleged
rapist and his victim were designated by different surnames on the
indictment created no presumption that they were not husband and
wife:
There is nothing in our statutes requiring or compelling the wife
to take or assume the name of her husband. While this is gen-
erally the case, yet the wife might retain her own name. She
might be married to the defendant and still be known by her
maiden name or some other name than his. 'It is said, the hus-
band being the head of the family, the wife and children. adopt
his family name - by custom the wife is called by the husband's
name; but whether marriage shall work any change of name at
all is, after all, a mere question of choice. . .
38. 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 617 (1961).
39. 177 N.E.2d at 619 (emphasis in original).
40. 73 Wis. 646, 41 N.W. 962 (1889).
41. 73 Wis. at 654, 41 N.W. at 965.
42. 37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897).
43. 38 S.W. at 802 (citations omitted).
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The Attorneys General of Maryland," Michigan,4 5 Minnesota,46
and Wisconsin47 have affirmed the right of married women to con-
tinue the use of their birth-given surnames for some or all purposes.
The Indiana legislature has adopted a statute explicitly authorizing
professional women to vote and to seek election for public office in the
names by which they are known professionally."
While there is thus a large amount of support for the Stuart con-
clusion in the American cases, there is also a body of law which sup-
ports the opposite result; these cases were relied upon by Judge Smith
in his dissent in Stuart. The primary source for this legal contention
is found in People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,4 9 where an Illinois court
determined that ". . . it is well settled by common-law principles and
immemorial custom that a woman upon marriage abandons her maiden
name and takes the husband's surname, with which is used her own
given name." 5 The law of married women's names is not well settled
in the United States. Although Lipsky cites several other cases in
support of its holding, the decision ignores those cases which have
reached the opposite conclusion." Furthermore, the legal authority
44. At 3 Op. MD. ATT'y GEN. 282 (1918) and at 10 Op. MD. Ar'y GEN. 183
(1925) the opinion was expressed that nothing in Maryland law prevents a woman
Notary Public from continuing to perform her official function by signing her birth-
given surname, even after she has married and has adopted the surname of her husband.
45. The Michigan Attorney General decided in 1923 that a woman who had
registered to vote before she married was not required to re-register after her mar-
riage. BIENNIEL REPORT, ATT'y GEN. OF MICH. 138 (1923-24). This position was
strengthened in 1935 when the Michigan Attorney General decided that a married
woman who had never used her husband's surname could seek public office in the
name by which she was commonly known. "There can be no doubt that a woman,
upon marriage, has the right to take the surname of her husband, and such is
customary, but there is no law which forbids a woman from continuing to use her
maiden name in all business dealings .. " BIENNIEL REPORT, ATr'y GEN. OF MICH.
254-55 (1935-36).
46. A married woman may seek public office in Minnesota in her birth-given
surname, as long as she files for candidacy in that name. 65 OP. MINN. ATr'y GEN.
103 (1945).
47. The Attorney General of Wisconsin concluded in an informal opinion that
"[in Wisconsin there is no law that requires a woman to assume the surname of
her husband at marriage, even for an instant." Op. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. (May 18, 1972).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-3428 (1969) establishes the correct procedure for
voter registration and stipulates that: ". . . this section shall not be construed to
prevent any professional woman from voting or becoming a candidate for public office
under the name used by her in the practice of her profession." Although this pro-
vision leaves the status of the surnames of non-professional married women in doubt,
it has recognized at the least that there is a possibility that some women want to be
known by a name other than that of their husbands.
49. 327 I1. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
50. 63 N.E.2d at 644.
51. See notes 35-43 supra and accompanying text.
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for the conclusion that marriage works an irrevocable and involuntary
change on the surname of a woman owes its existence to erroneous
assumptions about the common law of England,52 judicial statements
irrelevant to the outcome of the cases under consideration53 and deci-
sions which apply to all members of the population, and not exclusively
to married women. 54 An analysis of the decisions on this point dem-
onstrates the common presence of these fallacies.
Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank,55 perhaps the earliest and
certainly one of the most influential cases dealing with the surname
of a married woman, is often cited for the following contention:
For several centuries, by the common law among all English
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her hus-
band's surname. That becomes her legal name, and she ceases
to be known by her maiden name. By that name she must sue
and be sued, make and take grants and execute all legal documents.
Her maiden surname is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known
thereby.5 6
The facts of Chapman demonstrate the irrelevance of this often-quoted
statement to the ground upon which the court based its decision. The
suit was brought by a married woman to recover stock purchased in
her birth-given surname before her marriage, and subsequently con-
fiscated by the federal government during the Civil War. The con-
fiscation proceeding was a travesty. The United States identified the
stock owner as Ver. S. Moore, an ambiguous abbreviation of the plain-
tiff's name before her marriage, and further alleged that the stock
owner was a member of the Confederate Congress, a judge in the
Confederate courts, and an officer in the Confederate army. Not one
of these allegations was true, and the confiscation was illegal, because
the government had authority to take property which would be used
to assist the rebellion and none other.5 7 Chapman took no part in the
Civil War and her property was not legally subject to confiscation.58
The fact that constructive service was made in a name which Chap-
man no longer used strengthened the cotrrt in its belief that the con-
52. See, e.g., Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437 (1881). Discussion
of this case is found in the text accompanying note 55 infra.
53. See note 63 infra.
54. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
55. 85 N.Y. 537 (1881).
56. Id. at 449.
57. Id. at 448.
58. Id.
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fiscation lacked essential elements of fairness,59 but this fact was only
one of many elements in the Chapman decision.60
Freeman v. Hawkins,6 a Texas case cited in support of the de-
cision in Lipksy,6" held that constructive service in the maiden name
of a woman who had adopted her husband's surname when she married
was inadequate to give the court personal jurisdiction over her. This
case did not undertake any general statement about married women's
surnames. Freeman is only one of a number of American decisions
concerned with the adequacy of notice of court proceedings against a
person who is commonly known by a name other than the one in which
notice is served.63 These cases have much more relevance to questions
of procedural due process than they do to a question concerning the
correct name for a married woman. Even in the cases in which the
person sought to be served is a married woman who has adopted her
husband's surname, the change of name has already taken place and
the sole question presented to the court is whether service in an aban-
doned name can be expected to give the person served reasonable
notice that proceedings are being taken against him or her.
In Bacon v. Boston Elevated Railway64 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts denied recovery to a married woman, injured
in an automobile accident through the negligence of defendant, be-
cause her own automobile was registered in her maiden name, and,
according to the court, thereby constituted a nuisance upon the high-
way and barred recovery. The court's decision was a factual one, based
upon the "uncontradicted evidence" that plaintiff had abandoned her
maiden name when she married and had used her husband's surname
for all purposes except that of registering her automobile.65 It is clear
from the court's discussion of the case that this unusual and unex-
plained departure from plaintiff's normal practice was the court's pri-
mary basis for denying recovery, and that the assertion, based on
59. Id. at 449-50.
60. Id. at 447-48.
61. 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364 (1890).
62. People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
63. A split of authorities exists in this area of the law as well as in the area of
married woman's surnames. Compare Freeman v. Hawkins, 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364
(1890) ; [and] Morris v. Tracy, 58 Kan. 137, 48 P. 571 (1897) (examples of cases
holding that constructive service upon a woman who has abandoned her birth-given
surname is inadequate) with Emery v. Kipp, 154 Cal. 83, 97 P. 17 (1908) (holding
that service in a name no longer used by the person being served was adequate notice
to give a court personal jurisdiction).
64. 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
65. 152 N.E. at 36.
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Chapman, that "[a]s a matter of law, after her marriage in 1921, her
legal name was Alice W. Bacon" 6 should not be given credence be-
yond the particular facts of the case.
A decision which has been heavily relied upon to support the
theory that marriage legally changes a woman's surname is In re
Kayaloff.67 This 1934 decision by a federal district court sitting in
New York held that a certificate of naturalization should be issued
to a married woman only in the surname of her husband, despite the
fact that the woman was a musician, known in her profession only by
her birth surname. The court's rationale was stated in the opinion;
as a federal court in New York it considered itself bound by the com-
mon law of New York as expressed by the state's highest court in
Chapman.68
The cases heretofore discussed are representative of the Ameri-
can cases which have been said to support the finding that a married
woman is required by law to adopt the surname of her husband. 9 All
of them have certain characteristics in common. First, none of these
decisions recognizes the existence of cases and other authorities in the
United States which have permitted married women to retain their
own surnames after marriage. Second, all of these cases assert that
the common law requires adoption by married women of the husband's
surname, but none looks to history or to precedent to discover whether
or not this statement can be supported by authority."° Third, none
66. Id.
67. 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
68. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437 (1881), discussed in the text
accompanying note 55 supra.
69. The cases cited in support of the contention that the common law requires a
married woman to adopt the surname of her husband can be grouped into two major
classes: first, those which deal with service of process upon a married woman who
has adopted her husband's surname [see note 63 supra]; and second, those which
deal with the use by a married woman of her husband's given name or initials as part
of her legal name. See Carlton v. Phelan, 100 Fla. 1164, 131 So. 117 (1930) ; Wilty
v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718
(1963) ; Kelle v. Crab Orchard Rural Fire Protection Dist., 164 Neb. 593, 83 N.W.2d
51 (1957) ; Uihlein v. Gladieux, 74 Ohio St. 232, 78 N.E. 363 (1906).
70. Three factors probably account for this failure. The first is the almost
universal impact of the practice. Very few married women do use surnames other
than their husbands', and from this observable fact it could be inferred, albeit perhaps
improperly, that the law requires women who marry to adopt their husbands' sur-
names. Second, one must consider the nature of most of the decisions which have
found such a legal requirement. Few of them turned on the legal question of the
proper surname for a married woman, and hence the courts may not have seen a need
to do extensive research on the subject. The third factor is inertia. Once several
decisions, containing dicta to the effect that a married woman's surname is her hus-
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of these decisions attempts to analyze the social conditions which led
to the existence of a custom whereby married women abandon their
own names and assume the names of their husbands, and none ex-
amines the social implications of continuing the practice.
It is impossible to attribute these failures either to malice or to
lack of competence on the part of the courts which accepted the view
that the common law requires a married woman to adopt her hus-
band's surname as her legal surname. The social and legal inequali-
ties which have been the traditional portion of married women, coupled
with the almost universal abandonment by married women of their
birth-given surnames, have created an environment in which the as-
sumption that this abandonment is a legal requirement can be readily
understood. Among the traditions which the United States inherited
from England were the practice of adoption of the husband's surname
by married women and the common law doctrine of coverture.7 '
Although the most onerous legal disabilities imposed upon married
women by the doctrine of coverture were abolished during the nine-
teenth century, both in England and in the United States by the adop-
tion of the Married Women's Property Acts, 2 the enactment of these
laws did not eliminate all vestiges of the guardianship relationship be-
tween husband and wife, nor did these laws change traditional views
of the proper role to be played in society by men and women. The
husband was still considered to be the head of the household and the
wage earner, 73 the wife's proper functions were still considered to be
band's, had been reported and gathered together in legal encyclopedias and annota-
tions, courts may have considered the question settled. 65 C.J.S. Names § 3(c)
(1966) and 57 AM. JuR. 2d Names § 9 (1971) each cite numerous cases which
supposedly support the common law "rule" that a married woman is required to take
her husband's surname. Only two cases cited by either encyclopedia actually held
that a married woman is required by law to use her husband's surname: People ex rel.
Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945), and In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp.
176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). Other cases cited in support of the contention cite no rule
about surnames of married women, base their conclusions upon the assertions made in
the law encyclopedias, or cite no authority at all. This variety of circular reasoning is
readily illustrated by two cases from Louisiana. In 1931 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that in that state no rule of law required a married woman to use her husband's
surname. Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376, 278. A later opinion
consulted C.J.S. and in 1963 the Louisiana court concluded that the "general rule"
required a married woman to adopt the surname of her husband. Wilty v. Jefferson
Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718 (1963).
71. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 45 (1971).
73. See, e.g., Bentley v. State, 37 Ala. App. 463, 70 So. 2d 430 (1954), where
the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the position of the husband as the head of
the household.
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child care and home-making.74 Most married women still continued
to be known by the surnames of their husbands. A further explana-
tion of the growth of a line of cases perpetuating the assumption that
the common law requires married women to adopt their husbands'
surnames lies in the fact that the question of the correct surname for
a married woman was not even at issue in any of the early cases, and
thus there was no real reason for the courts to question the legal
validity of their preconceived opinions on the subject.7"
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
With the Stuart decision the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
the right of Maryland residents to the common law of England,76
clarified Maryland's stance on state authority to regulate the use of
names in general, and the use of names by married women in par-
ticular,77 and continued its policy of construing narrowly statutes in
derogation of the common law ;78 however, the decision represents
more than a response to these specific questions. The Stuart decision
will not have far-reaching consequences for the daily lives of very
many people, but it is nevertheless significant, for it marks a rejection
of one of the most obvious symbols of the second class status of women
under the law. The position advocated by Judge Smith in his dis-
senting opinion ignores the legitimate desire of some married women
to maintain an identity separate from that of their husbands, and in
addition is subject to constitutional attack under existing judicial in-
terpretations of the fourteenth amendment.7 9
Requiring a woman to change her legal surname at marriage
without imposing a similar requirement upon men creates an ipso
facto classification by sex. Although states may create classifications
and pass laws which accord unequal treatment to people in different
classes, these classifications must have a rational basis which corre-
sponds to the purpose of the legislation in order to be valid under the
74. In 1961 the Supreme Court of the United States was able to uphold a state
statute limiting service by women on juries to volunteers on the basis of the assumption
that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
75. See note 69 supra.
76. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 5 provides in part: "That the In-
habitant of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England. . .
77. See p. 410 supra.
78. See note 9 supra.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "No State shall .. . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fourteenth amendment."0 Forbush v. Wallace,"' a 1971 challenge to
Alabama's policy of requiring a married woman to use her husband's
surname to obtain a driver's license, found a rational basis of adminis-
trative convenience in the state's requirement."2 Forbush, however,
raises more questions than it answers. The three-judge federal court
which heard Forbush found that the common law of Alabama required
married women to adopt their husband's surnames.8 3 Assuming that
this is a correct assessment of the law of Alabama, 4 there is a thres-
hold constitutional question; is there a rational basis for the common
law requirement? The Forbush decision ignores this question.
Forbush does not touch on the issues raised by the Supreme Court
in Reed v. Reed,"5 a sex-discrimination case in which the Court re-
jected administrative convenience as a legitimate basis for differenti-
ating between the sexes. Therein the Court stated that "[t]o give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."88
Most importantly, however, Forbush ignores the strict standards
set up by the Supreme Court for dealing with state regulations which
create particularly egregious categories of people or which hinder the
exercise of certain fundamental rights.87 The Court has held that a
80. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See note
12 supra.
81. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (three-judge court), aff'd per curian,
405 U.S. 970 (1972).
82. Id. at 221-22.
83. Id.
84. The validity of this conclusion is open to question, for neither of the Alabama
cases cited by the Forbush court is directly on point. Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala.
658, 173 So. 38 (1937), upheld the validity of a claim against the estate of Hattie W.
Jones, even though it was presented in the name of Mrs. J.C. Jones. This case is
merely an addition to the list of cases involving use by a married woman of the
husband's given name. See note 69 supra. Bentley v. State, 37 Ala. App. 463, 70
So. 2d 430 (1954), held that a married woman who had followed her husband to a
new abode could not be convicted of removing her husband's property from their
former abode absent evidence of conspiracy. In support of its holding the court
pointed out that a married woman was obligated to follow her husband when he
changed abode, and, in dictum, noted that the husband "furnishes the name" for the
wife and family. 70 So. 2d at 432. Statements in these two cases as to the correct
name of a married woman are subject to the infirmities of other American cases,
and thus the common law of Alabama was not settled on the question of married
women's surnames before the decision in Forbush.
85. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
86. Id. at 76-77.
87. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880). See note 12 supra.
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compelling state interest in imposing requirements which make such
classifications or which infringe upon such rights must be demonstrated
before such a statute will be sustained." Although only one court
has found sex to be such a "suspect classification" as to compel the
use of the stricter standard of constitutional scrutiny,89 the judiciary
is becoming increasingly aware of the invidious nature of classifica-
tions by sex." The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right
to vote is a right so fundamental that any statute seeking to circum-
scribe it must meet the compelling interest test.9' Although opinions
as to the validity of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may vary,9" it is clear
that under current standards for review Stuart raises serious consti-
tutional questions which should be considered by any opinion which
88. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
89. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
In finding that sex, like race and national origin, was a class which should be
"suspect" in determining questions of equal protection, the California Supreme Court
pointed out that:
Sex . . . is an immutable trait, a status into which the class members are
locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statutes,
such as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society . . . . Women like Negroes, aliens, and the
poor have historically labored, under severe legal and social disabilities.
5 Cal. 3d at 19-20, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. Certainly, in any view of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment which accepts the validity
of making certain classifications suspect, sex is an appropriate addition to the list.
90. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (law which arbitrarily favors
men over women as executors of decedents' estates violates equal protection) ; Mengel-
koch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1971) (maximum hours
law applicable only to women poses a substantial federal question) ; Bray v. Lee, 337
F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972) (admissions standards to Boston Latin Schools which
are higher for girls than for boys denies women the equal protection of the laws);
Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970)
(three-judge court) (state cannot deny women equal access to state university's
prestige college) ; White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge
court) (exclusion of women from jury service is forbidden by fourteenth amendment) ;
Peterson Tavern & Grill Owner's Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270
A.2d 628 (1970) (women cannot be excluded from employment as bartenders);
Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967) (action for loss of
consortium, formerly available to husband only, now available to husband and wifejointly, as action for damage to marital relationship).
91. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); William v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
92. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CA. L. REv. 341 (1949) ; Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HAav.
L. Rsv. 1067 (1969).
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would seek to uphold a requirement that married women use only the
surnames of their husbands in registering to vote.
CONCLUSION
The law of personal names is a relatively unimportant legal issue,
since the only public importance which names have is as a means for
identifying individuals. Thus, names have been subject to only minor
governmental control,93 and where governments have interfered with
the individual selection of names, they have assumed only the bare
power necessary to prevent fraud. However the fact that names tradi-
tionally have been a matter of personal choice does not mean that the
law does not recognize the importance of personal names to indi-
viduals. As recently as 1971 the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
the importance of the right of fathers to have their children bear their
names.9 4 In fact, it may be recognition of the importance of names to
individuals as symbols of identity and as links with the past that has
made the law so hesitant to regulate the use of names by individuals.
In holding that the Board of Election Supervisors cannot deny Mary
Stuart the right to register to vote in her birth-given surname, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has affirmed two important principles. It
has recognized the sphere of personal names as an area of purely per-
sonal importance, not to be subjected lightly to state regulation, and
it has said to women that their personal names are as important as
those of men.
The tendency for married women to abandon their family sur-
names and to become known exclusively by the surnames of their hus-
bands evolved concurrently with the erosion of the rights of married
women to own property and to deal with their own legal affairs with-
out the consent and assistance of their husbands.95 While no affirma-
tive evidence can be produced to demonstrate that these two practices
93. It is only within the past fifty to one hundred years that states have com-
monly adopted statutory procedures for name-change to supplement the common law
change of name by reputation. The majority view in those states which do have
statutory name change procedures is that those procedures do not abrogate the right
of the individual to change his or her legal name by use of a new name. Reinken v.
Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639, 640 (1933). Maryland does not have a statutory
name-change procedure, although it does have a judicial method of name-change which
is described in MD. R.P. BH 70-75.
94. In West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 300, 283 A.2d 401, 402 (1971) the court said:
[T]o deprive the son of his father's surname is a serious and far-reaching action
. . . the father has a natural right to have his son bear his name . . . the
court should not endeavor to interfere with the usual custom of succession of
paternal surname nor foster any unnatural barrier between father and son.
95. See Hughes, "And Then There Were Two" 23 HAST. L.J. 233 (1971).
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were related on the level of legal theory, it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that there is a practical relationship between the married woman's
loss of her family surname and her loss of legal identity. The sym-
bolic connection between these two trends is apparent; if the purpose
of a name is to facilitate individual identity, and the identity of a
married woman is found in the person of her husband, then there is
no reason to identify her by a name other than her husband's name.96
The fact that women still continue to use their husbands' surnames
when coverture has been abolished for nearly a century is an indica-
tion of the pervasiveness of the societal notion that women should
live through and be identified with the achievements of their male
associates. In deciding that women have the same rights as men with
regard to the choice of their personal names, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has dissociated the law of Maryland from this outmoded con-
cept. With the decision in Stuart Maryland has taken an important
symbolic step toward true equality under the law for men and women.
96. It is possible to infer that a woman, during the period of her coverture, had
no legal surname at all, but merely bore her husband's surname as a matter of
courtesy. See Converse v. Converse, 9 Rich. Eq. 535, 539-40 (S.C. 1856). Thus, in
early English cases the court will often refer to the husband by his given and sur-
name, at the same time designating the wife by her given name only. See, e.g.,
Davies v. Lowndes, 131 Eng. Rep. 1247 (1835), where the court throughout the
opinion refers to the plaintiffs as John Davies and Elizabeth, his wife.
